The Economic Incentives of Cultural Transmission: Spatial Evidence from Naming Patterns Across France

82 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2021

See all articles by Yann Algan

Yann Algan

Universite Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne - CNRS-EUREQUA; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Clément Malgouyres

Institut des politiques publiques (PSE)

Thierry Mayer

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - TEAM; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS); CEPII, Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Info. Internationales, Paris; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Mathias Thoenig

University of Lausanne; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Abstract

This paper studies how economic incentives influence cultural transmission, using a crucial expression of cultural identity: Child naming decisions. Our focus is on Arabic versus Non-Arabic names given in France over the 2003-2007 period. Our model of cultural transmission features three determinants: (i) vertical (parental) cultural transmission culture; (ii) horizontal (neighborhood) influence; (iii) information on the economic penalty associated with Arabic names. We find that economic incentives largely influence naming choices: Would the parental expectation on the economic penalty be zero, the annual number of babies born with an Arabic name would be more than 50 percent larger.

JEL Classification: Z1, J3

Suggested Citation

Algan, Yann and Malgouyres, Clément and Mayer, Thierry and Thoenig, Mathias, The Economic Incentives of Cultural Transmission: Spatial Evidence from Naming Patterns Across France. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3870208 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3870208

Yann Algan (Contact Author)

Universite Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne - CNRS-EUREQUA ( email )

106-112 Boulevard de l'Hopital
Paris Cedex 13, 75647
France

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Clément Malgouyres

Institut des politiques publiques (PSE) ( email )

48 boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014
France

Thierry Mayer

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - TEAM ( email )

106-112 boulevard de l'hôpital
Cedex 13 Paris, P75647
France

HOME PAGE: http://team.univ-paris1.fr/teamperso/mayer/thierry.htm

Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS) ( email )

28, rue des Saints-Peres
75007 Paris
France
+33 1 4407 8267 (Phone)
+33 1 4407 8267 (Fax)

CEPII, Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Info. Internationales, Paris ( email )

9 Rue Georges Pitard
Paris Cedex 15, F-75015
France

HOME PAGE: http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/pagepers/mayer.htm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Mathias Thoenig

University of Lausanne ( email )

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
4
Abstract Views
79
PlumX Metrics