Red Tape: Oiling the Hinges of the 'Revolving Door'

22 Pages Posted: 12 May 2003

See all articles by Elise S. Brezis

Elise S. Brezis

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jacob Paroush

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics

Avi Weiss

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: December 2002

Abstract

This paper presents a behavioral model of regulators. In our model, the regulator creates red tape - bureaucratic rules and regulations that complicate procedures in an industry. As the enactor of these rules and regulations, the regulator has better knowledge of the ins-and-outs of the system and any possible loopholes. Such knowledge is valuable to the firms in the industry, and thus, after leaving public service, the regulator can cash-in on the red tape he has created. Comparative statics show a negative relationship between the amount of red tape generated and the duration of the cooling-off period. Analysis of the data yields results compatible with this outcome.

Keywords: Red tape, Cooling-Off Periods, Revolving Door, Regulation

JEL Classification: K23, L51

Suggested Citation

Brezis, Elise S. and Paroush, Jacob and Weiss, Avi, Red Tape: Oiling the Hinges of the 'Revolving Door' (December 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=387424 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.387424

Elise S. Brezis

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
972-3-5318946 (Phone)
972-3-5353186 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Jacob Paroush

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
+972.3.531.8569 (Phone)
+972.3.535.3180 (Fax)

Avi Weiss (Contact Author)

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
+972 3 531 8934 (Phone)
+972 3 535 3180 (Fax)

Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel ( email )

15 Ha'ari Street
Jerusalem
Israel

HOME PAGE: http://taubcenter.org.il/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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