Smart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School Choice

60 Pages Posted: 28 Jun 2021 Last revised: 4 Aug 2024

See all articles by Felipe Arteaga

Felipe Arteaga

University of California, Berkeley

Adam Kapor

Princeton University

Christopher Neilson

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; Princeton University - Princeton School of Public and International Affairs

Seth D. Zimmerman

Yale University; University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Date Written: June 2021

Abstract

Many school districts with centralized school choice adopt strategyproof assignment mechanisms to relieve applicants of the need to strategize on the basis of beliefs about their own admissions chances. This paper shows that beliefs about admissions chances shape choice outcomes even when the assignment mechanism is strategyproof by influencing the way applicants search for schools, and that “smart matching platforms” that provide live feedback on admissions chances help applicants search more effectively. Motivated by a model in which applicants engage in costly search for schools and over-optimism can lead to under-search, we use data from a large-scale survey of choice participants in Chile to show that learning about schools is hard, that beliefs about admissions chances guide the decision to stop searching, and that applicants systematically underestimate non-placement risk. We then use RCT and RD research designs to evaluate scaled live feedback policies in the Chilean and New Haven choice systems. 22% of applicants submitting applications where risks of non-placement are high respond to warnings by adding schools to their lists, reducing non-placement risk by 58% and increasing test score value added at the schools where they enroll by 0.10 standard deviations. Reducing the burden of school choice requires not just strategyproofness inside the centralized system, but also choice supports for the strategic decisions that inevitably remain outside of it.

Suggested Citation

Arteaga, Felipe and Kapor, Adam and Neilson, Christopher and Zimmerman, Seth D., Smart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School Choice (June 2021). NBER Working Paper No. w28946, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3875113

Felipe Arteaga (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Adam Kapor

Princeton University ( email )

22 Chambers Street
Princeton, NJ 08544-0708
United States

Christopher Neilson

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

Princeton University - Princeton School of Public and International Affairs ( email )

Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

Seth D. Zimmerman

Yale University ( email )

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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