76 Pages Posted: 13 Mar 2003 Last revised: 21 Sep 2008
Date Written: March 1, 2003
In this Article, we introduce the concept of anti-property - a private conservation mechanism that allows only socially desirable development. Our mechanism utilizes veto rights to create a collective holdout dynamic that thwarts undesirable uses of conservation commons. We demonstrate, counterintuitively, that when transaction costs systematically bias the market against conservation, the best response may be to create countervailing transaction costs. We also show how the combination of a private anti-property mechanism with a carefully designed takings law may result in an optimal balance between conservation and development.
Keywords: property, conservation, preservation, commons, anticommons
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bell, Abraham and Parchomovsky, Gideon, Of Property and Anti-Property (March 1, 2003). U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper 03-04; Michigan Law Review, Vol. 102, p. 1, 2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=387520 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.387520