Exploiting Symmetry in High-Dimensional Dynamic Programming

50 Pages Posted: 1 Jul 2021

See all articles by Mahdi Ebrahimi Kahou

Mahdi Ebrahimi Kahou

University of British Columbia (UBC)

Jesús Fernández-Villaverde

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jesse Perla

University of British Columbia (UBC)

Arnav Sood

Carnegie Mellon University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2021

Abstract

We propose a new method for solving high-dimensional dynamic programming problems and recursive competitive equilibria with a large (but finite) number of heterogeneous agents using deep learning. The „curse of dimensionality“ is avoided due to four complementary techniques: (1) exploiting symmetry in the approximate law of motion and the value function; (2) constructing a concentration of measure to calculate high-dimensional expectations using a single Monte Carlo draw from the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks; (3) sampling methods to ensure the model fits along manifolds of interest; and (4) selecting the most generalizable over-parameterized deep learning approximation without calculating the stationary distribution or applying a transversality condition. As an application, we solve a global solution of a multi-firm version of the classic Lucas and Prescott (1971) model of „investment under uncertainty.“ First, we compare the solution against a linear-quadratic Gaussian version for validation and benchmarking. Next, we solve nonlinear versions with aggregate shocks. Finally, we describe how our approach applies to a large class of models in economics.

JEL Classification: C450, C600, C630

Suggested Citation

Kahou, Mahdi Ebrahimi and Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús and Perla, Jesse and Sood, Arnav, Exploiting Symmetry in High-Dimensional Dynamic Programming (2021). CESifo Working Paper No. 9161, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3875995 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3875995

Mahdi Ebrahimi Kahou (Contact Author)

University of British Columbia (UBC) ( email )

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Jesús Fernández-Villaverde

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Jesse Perla

University of British Columbia (UBC) ( email )

2329 West Mall
Vancouver, British Columbia BC V6T 1Z4
Canada

Arnav Sood

Carnegie Mellon University ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

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