A Theory of Credit Cycles under Pandemic

40 Pages Posted: 2 Jul 2021

See all articles by Feng Dong

Feng Dong

Tsinghua University - Tsinghua University School of Economics and Management

Pengfei Wang

Peking University HSBC Business School

Zhiwei Xu

Fudan University - School of Economics

Date Written: June 30, 2021

Abstract

We develop a tractable dynamic theory linking endogenous credit cycles with conditions in the labor market, in which a pandemic may cripple credit markets and even cause a credit collapse by freezing the labor supply. We execute the idea in a general equilibrium framework with banks and financially constrained heterogeneous firms. In the static model, a modest pandemic disrupts the credit markets only at the intensive margin by decreasing the labor supply. A worsening pandemic can trigger a credit crisis, followed by a discontinuous sharp fall in aggregate output. By extending to a dynamic general equilibrium setting, we show that this mechanism can generate endogenous boom-bust credit cycles. Credit injection per se cannot adequately stabilize the economy. The lockdown policy combined with subsidizing firms turns out to be an efficient policy package to curb pandemic-induced recession.

Keywords: Endogenous Credit Cycles, Pandemic Induced Recession, Lockdown Policy, Credit Policy

JEL Classification: E31, E32, E41, E51, E52

Suggested Citation

Dong, Feng and Wang, Pengfei and Xu, Zhiwei, A Theory of Credit Cycles under Pandemic (June 30, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3876824 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3876824

Feng Dong

Tsinghua University - Tsinghua University School of Economics and Management ( email )

Room 623, Lihua Building, School of Economics and
Beijing, Beijing 100084
China

Pengfei Wang (Contact Author)

Peking University HSBC Business School ( email )

Zhiwei Xu

Fudan University - School of Economics ( email )

600 GuoQuan Road
Shanghai, 200433
China

HOME PAGE: http://https://xuzhiwei09.wixsite.com/econ

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