International Tax Law Between Loyalty, Exit, and Voice

Abstract

Discourse on the merits and pitfalls of multilateral cooperation for advancing justice in international tax law have recently re-emerged in the literature. Some tax scholars, even while criticizing global projects like the OECD/G20 initiatives on base erosion, profit shifting and the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy, insist that cooperative efforts herald a step in the right direction. Others contest the feasibility of international cooperation or its value for developing countries. Drawing on Albert Hirschman’s oft-cited framework for actor behaviour under institutional malperformance, this article shows that there are three alternatives for those discontented with the status quo: to remain loyal despite disagreeing (cooperation); exit and perhaps form a competing regime (competition); or try to change the existing rules by speaking up (un-cooperation). The article concludes that the interaction of these options (contested cooperation) is an integral part of today’s transnational tax law order.

Keywords: International tax law, tax competition, International cooperation, multilateralism, federalism, Albert Hirschman, developing countries, OECD, BEPS

JEL Classification: E63, F02, F50, F53, F59, H2, H11, H21, H87, K33, K34, N4, P45