Lying in Persuasion

53 Pages Posted: 8 Jul 2021 Last revised: 30 Jan 2023

See all articles by Arturas Rozenas

Arturas Rozenas

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics

Zhaotian Luo

University of Chicago, Department of Political Science

Date Written: January 30, 2023

Abstract

We develop a model where the speaker strategically obtains information about which they can lie to persuade the audience. In the equilibrium where the option to lie is exercised, the speaker obtains more persuasive information than in the equilibrium where they speak the truth. The conditions for equilibrium with lying are restrictive: the risk that the speaker’s lie will be detected must be neither too small nor too large, and the audience must be sufficiently inclined ex-ante to do what the speaker is asking – lying is used to nudge, not to push. We apply the model to analyze persuasion by media and show how making fact-checking more prevalent may increase misinformation.

Suggested Citation

Rozenas, Arturas and Luo, Zhaotian, Lying in Persuasion (January 30, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3878448 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3878448

Arturas Rozenas (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics ( email )

19 West 4
New York, NY 10012
United States

Zhaotian Luo

University of Chicago, Department of Political Science ( email )

5825 S University Ave
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
310
Abstract Views
1,123
Rank
168,956
PlumX Metrics