How the Irish Courts Protect and Promote Stakeholder Interests

Blogging for Sustainability, Department of Private Law, University of Oslo, 2021

3 Pages Posted: 28 Jul 2021

See all articles by Michael James Boland

Michael James Boland

National University of Ireland, Maynooth (NUI Maynooth) - Faculty of Law

Date Written: July 1, 2021

Abstract

This Comment attempts to challenge the view that company directors in Ireland owe their duties to shareholders alone. While statute provides that directors owe their duties "to the company (and the company alone)", this has been interpreted to mean that directors only owe their duties to the shareholders. In the first instance, this interpretation fails to take account of the company's separate legal personality and, in the second instance, it is inconsistent with the approach of the Irish Courts in corporate enforcement cases. These cases make it clear that the 'interests of the company' go much further than the interests of the shareholders alone. Rather, the interests of the company includes the interests of all stakeholders like employees, consumers and society at large. Therefore, when directors exercise their duties, the Courts have made it clear that they must take account of a variety of interests not just those of shareholders.

Keywords: Directors' Duties; Employees; Consumers; Tax; Stakeholders; Company Law; Corporate Enforcement; Restriction; Disqualification; Sustainability; Shareholders; Ireland; Courts

JEL Classification: K, K2, K22, K30, K31, K34, K42

Suggested Citation

Boland, Michael James, How the Irish Courts Protect and Promote Stakeholder Interests (July 1, 2021). Blogging for Sustainability, Department of Private Law, University of Oslo, 2021, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3880588 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3880588

Michael James Boland (Contact Author)

National University of Ireland, Maynooth (NUI Maynooth) - Faculty of Law ( email )

Maynooth, County Kildare
Ireland

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