Would I Lie to You? How Interaction with Chatbots Induces Dishonesty

42 Pages Posted: 8 Jul 2021 Last revised: 28 May 2024

See all articles by Christian Biener

Christian Biener

Institute of Insurance Economics, University of St. Gallen; Swiss Finance Institute; University of St.Gallen

Aline Waeber

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: May 24, 2024

Abstract

Is dishonesty more prevalent in interactions with chatbots compared to humans? Amidst the rise of artificial intelligence, this question holds significant economic implications. We conduct a novel experiment where participants report the outcome of a private, payout-relevant random draw to either a chatbot or a human counterpart, with varying degrees of signaled agency. We find that signaling agency increases honesty when interacting with humans but not with chatbots. Moreover, participants are consistently more honest with humans in the presence of agency cues. Our results suggest that social image concerns and perceived honesty norms play a more prominent role in human interactions. Surprisingly, standard online forms generate the same levels of honesty as human-to-human chat interactions. These findings offer valuable insights for designing effective communication and trust-building mechanisms in digital economies where human-chatbot interactions are increasingly prevalent.

Keywords: lying, honesty, chatbot, communication, lying cost, agency

JEL Classification: C91, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Biener, Christian and Waeber, Aline, Would I Lie to You? How Interaction with Chatbots Induces Dishonesty (May 24, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3881084 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3881084

Christian Biener (Contact Author)

Institute of Insurance Economics, University of St. Gallen ( email )

Girtannerstrasse 6
St. Gallen, St. Gallen 9010
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://ivw.unisg.ch/cb

Swiss Finance Institute ( email )

c/o University of Geneva
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
CH-1211 Geneva 4
Switzerland

University of St.Gallen ( email )

St.Gallen, 9000
Switzerland

Aline Waeber

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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