Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation

66 Pages Posted: 12 Jul 2021 Last revised: 26 Oct 2022

See all articles by Laurent Bouton

Laurent Bouton

Georgetown University - Department of Economics

Aniol Llorente-Saguer

Queen Mary University of London

Antonin Macé

Paris School of Economics, CNRS and ENS

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2021

Abstract

This paper examines the comparative properties of voting rules based on the richness of their ballot spaces, assuming a given distribution of voting rights. We focus on how well voting rules aggregate the information dispersed among voters. We consider how different voting rules affect both voters’ decisions at the voting stage and the incentives of the agenda-setter who decides whether to put the proposal to a vote. Without agenda-setter, the voting efficiency of rules is higher when their ballot space is richer. Moreover, full-information efficiency requires full divisibility of the votes. In the presence of an agenda-setter, we uncover a novel trade-off: in some cases, rules with high voting efficiency provide worse incentives to the agenda-setter to select good proposals. This negative effect can be large enough to wash out the higher voting efficiency of even the most efficient rules.

Suggested Citation

Bouton, Laurent and Llorente-Saguer, Aniol and Macé, Antonin and Xefteris, Dimitrios, Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation (July 2021). NBER Working Paper No. w29005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3884699

Laurent Bouton (Contact Author)

Georgetown University - Department of Economics ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States

Aniol Llorente-Saguer

Queen Mary University of London ( email )

Lincoln's Inn Fields
Mile End Rd.
London, E1 4NS
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/aniollls/

Antonin Macé

Paris School of Economics, CNRS and ENS ( email )

France

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/antoninmace/home

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus ( email )

75 Kallipoleos Street
P.O. Box 20537
1678 Nicosia
Cyprus

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