Decide as You Would with Full Information! An Argument against Ex Ante Pareto

Decide as You Would with Full Information! An Argument against ex ante Pareto. Marc Fleurbaey and Alex Voorhoeve. In Nir Eyal, Samia Hurst, Ole Norheim, and Dan Wikler (eds.), Inequalities in Health: Concepts, Measures, and Ethics. Oxford University Press (2013), pp. 113-128.

24 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2021

See all articles by Marc Fleurbaey

Marc Fleurbaey

Paris School of Economics

Alex Voorhoeve

Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, LSE

Date Written: September 13, 2012

Abstract

Policy-makers must sometimes choose between an alternative which has somewhat lower expected value for each person, but which will substantially improve the outcomes of the worst off, or an alternative which has somewhat higher expected value for each person, but which will leave those who end up worst off substantially less well off. The popular ex ante Pareto principle requires the choice of the alternative with higher expected utility for each. We argue that ex ante Pareto ought to be rejected because it conflicts with the requirement that, when possible, one ought to decide as one would with full information. We apply our argument in an analysis of US policy on screening for breast cancer.

Keywords: Pareto Principle, Egalitarianism, Decision-Making Under Risk, Social Choice Theory

Suggested Citation

Fleurbaey, Marc and Voorhoeve, Alex, Decide as You Would with Full Information! An Argument against Ex Ante Pareto (September 13, 2012). Decide as You Would with Full Information! An Argument against ex ante Pareto. Marc Fleurbaey and Alex Voorhoeve. In Nir Eyal, Samia Hurst, Ole Norheim, and Dan Wikler (eds.), Inequalities in Health: Concepts, Measures, and Ethics. Oxford University Press (2013), pp. 113-128., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3885756

Marc Fleurbaey

Paris School of Economics ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

Alex Voorhoeve (Contact Author)

Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, LSE ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/voorhoev

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