The Effect of Mergers on Variety in Grocery Retailing

85 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2021

See all articles by Tomaso Duso

Tomaso Duso

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin); TU Berlin- Faculty of Economics and Management - Empirical Industrial Organization; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Elena Argentesi

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Paolo Buccirossi

Lear - Laboratory of Economics, Antitrust, Regulation

Roberto Cervone

Financial Conduct Authority

Alessia Marrazzo

Lear - Laboratory of Economics, Antitrust, Regulation

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 1, 2021

Abstract

We study the effect of a merger between two Dutch supermarket chains to assess its effect on the depth as well as composition of assortment. We adopt a difference-in-differences strategy that exploits local variation in the merger's effects, controlling for selection on observables through a matching procedure when defining our control group. We show that the merger led the merging parties to reposition their assortment to avoid cannibalization in the areas where they directly competed before the merger. While the low-variety target's stores reduced the depth of their assortment when in direct competition with the acquirer, the latter increased their assortment. This suggests that variety is a strategic variable in retail chains' response to changes in local competition.

JEL Classification: C23, D22, K21, L1, L41, L66, L81

Suggested Citation

Duso, Tomaso and Argentesi, Elena and Buccirossi, Paolo and Cervone, Roberto and Marrazzo, Alessia, The Effect of Mergers on Variety in Grocery Retailing (June 1, 2021). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16230, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3886672

Tomaso Duso

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) ( email )

Mohrenstraße 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany

TU Berlin- Faculty of Economics and Management - Empirical Industrial Organization ( email )

Berlin, 10585
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Elena Argentesi (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, BO 40141
Italy
+39 051 209 2664 (Phone)
+39 051 209 8040 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.unibo.it/sitoweb/elena.argentesi/en

Paolo Buccirossi

Lear - Laboratory of Economics, Antitrust, Regulation ( email )

Via di Monserrato, 48
Rome, 00186
Italy

Roberto Cervone

Financial Conduct Authority ( email )

25 The North Colonnade
Canary Wharf
London, E14 5HS
United Kingdom

Alessia Marrazzo

Lear - Laboratory of Economics, Antitrust, Regulation ( email )

Via di Monserrato, 48
Rome, 00186
Italy

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