Bargaining Over Treatment Choice Under Disagreement

59 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2021

See all articles by Nabil I. Al-Najjar

Nabil I. Al-Najjar

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Robert J. Gary-Bobo

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne; CREST ENSAE; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: July 2021

Abstract

A group of experts with different prior beliefs must choose a treatment. A dataset is made public and leads to revisions of beliefs. We propose a model where the experts' disagreements are resolved through bargaining, using the Nash bargaining solution. Experts bargain after disclosure of the dataset. Bargaining may lead to an inefficient use of information in a strong sense: experts receive a lower payoff in every state, and for any prior belief (i.e., inadmissibility). Bargaining exhibits under-reaction to information as compared to the normative solution in which experts bargain ex ante on the procedure used to exploit the data.

Suggested Citation

Al-Najjar, Nabil I. and Gary-Bobo, Robert J., Bargaining Over Treatment Choice Under Disagreement (July 2021). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16326, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3886812

Nabil I. Al-Najjar (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-5426 (Phone)
847-467-1220 (Fax)

Robert J. Gary-Bobo

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne ( email )

17, rue de la Sorbonne
Paris, IL 75005
France

CREST ENSAE ( email )

15 Boulevard Gabriel Peri
Malakoff Cedex, 1 92245
France
+33141176031 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.crest.fr/ses.php?user=3042

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
0
Abstract Views
256
PlumX Metrics