Too Long; Didn't Read: Finding Meaning in Platforms’ Terms of Service Agreements

26 Pages Posted: 12 Aug 2021

See all articles by Michael Karanicolas

Michael Karanicolas

UCLA Institute for Technology, Law & Policy; Yale University - Yale Information Society Project

Date Written: July 15, 2021

Abstract

It has become a common trope to note that online terms of service agreements are lengthy, obtuse, and universally ignored by the millions of users who bind themselves under these contracts every minute of every day. However, the enormous power that a handful of online platforms now wield over the global expressive discourse, power which is manifested through interpretations of the content standards laid out in these byzantine documents, has led to a growing focus on how these rules are set, modified, and interpreted. In the context of an ongoing debate around reform proposals to section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, this article argues for a model of contractual interpretation which limits the scope of protection available to platforms through the boilerplate exculpatory clauses in their terms of service agreements. The article justifies this position through a comparative analysis of the user agreements of the three largest platforms, to demonstrate a widening gap between the structure of the content policies and privacy policies on one hand, and the boilerplate terms of service on the other, arguing that this structural evolution supports the application of theories of contract and pseudo-contract to interpreting the terms of service.

Keywords: boilerplate, freedom of expression, privacy, platform law, contract law, section 230, law and technology, facebook, twitter, youtube

Suggested Citation

Karanicolas, Michael, Too Long; Didn't Read: Finding Meaning in Platforms’ Terms of Service Agreements (July 15, 2021). University of Toledo Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2021, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3887753 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3887753

Michael Karanicolas (Contact Author)

UCLA Institute for Technology, Law & Policy ( email )

Yale University - Yale Information Society Project ( email )

127 Wall Street
New Haven, CT 06511
United States

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