Simultaneous and Sequential Anticommons

22 Pages Posted: 20 Mar 2003

See all articles by Francesco Parisi

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

Norbert Schulz

University of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics

Ben Depoorter

UC Hastings Law; Stanford Law School Center for Internet & Society; Ugent - CASLE


This paper defines a framework for anticommons analysis based on the fragmentation of property rights. In differentiating between sequential and simultaneous cases of property fragmentation, we describe and assess the equilibria obtained under each scenario. Our model reveals how the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their decisions. Moreover, our model suggests that the result of underutilization of joint property increases monotonically in both (a) the extent of fragmentation; and (b) the foregone synergies and complementarities between the property fragments. Within this context, we can therefore explore important implications for possible institutional responses to a range of issues raised by the concept of property fragmentation.

JEL Classification: K10, K11, K19, D62, D70

Suggested Citation

Parisi, Francesco and Schulz, Norbert and Depoorter, Ben, Simultaneous and Sequential Anticommons. European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 17, No. 2, March 2004, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-11, Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 279, Available at SSRN: or

Francesco Parisi (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )

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University of Bologna ( email )

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Norbert Schulz

University of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics ( email )

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Ben Depoorter

UC Hastings Law ( email )

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United States

Stanford Law School Center for Internet & Society ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
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United States

Ugent - CASLE ( email )

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