Simultaneous and Sequential Anticommons

22 Pages Posted: 20 Mar 2003

See all articles by Francesco Parisi

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

Norbert Schulz

University of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics

Ben Depoorter

University of California Hastings College of Law; Ugent - CASLE; Stanford Law School Center for Internet & Society

Abstract

This paper defines a framework for anticommons analysis based on the fragmentation of property rights. In differentiating between sequential and simultaneous cases of property fragmentation, we describe and assess the equilibria obtained under each scenario. Our model reveals how the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their decisions. Moreover, our model suggests that the result of underutilization of joint property increases monotonically in both (a) the extent of fragmentation; and (b) the foregone synergies and complementarities between the property fragments. Within this context, we can therefore explore important implications for possible institutional responses to a range of issues raised by the concept of property fragmentation.

JEL Classification: K10, K11, K19, D62, D70

Suggested Citation

Parisi, Francesco and Schulz, Norbert and Depoorter, Ben, Simultaneous and Sequential Anticommons. European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 17, No. 2, March 2004; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-11; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 279. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=388880 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.388880

Francesco Parisi (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

University of Bologna ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy

Norbert Schulz

University of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics ( email )

Sanderring 2
Lehrstuhl VWL III
D-97070 Wuerzburg
Germany
+49-931/31 29 60 (Phone)
+49-931/31 26 21 (Fax)

Ben Depoorter

University of California Hastings College of Law ( email )

200 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
United States

Ugent - CASLE ( email )

Universiteitstraat 4
Belgium

Stanford Law School Center for Internet & Society ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

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