You Can't Handle the Truth: The Effects of the Post-9/11 Gi Bill on Higher Education and Earnings

80 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2021 Last revised: 21 Apr 2024

See all articles by Andrew Barr

Andrew Barr

Texas A&M University

Laura Kawano

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor

Bruce Sacerdote

Dartmouth College - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Bill Skimmyhorn

Mason School of Business, College of William & Mary; U.S. Army Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis

Michael Stevens

U.S. Department of the Treasury

Date Written: July 2021

Abstract

The Post 9/11 GI Bill (PGIB) is among the largest and most generous college subsidies enacted thus far in the U.S. We examine the impact of the PGIB on veterans’ college-going, degree completion, federal education tax benefit utilization, and long run earnings. Among veterans potentially induced to enroll, the introduction of the PGIB raised college enrollment by 0.17 years and B.A. completion by 1.2 percentage points (on a base of 9 percent). But, the PGIB reduced average annual earnings nine years after separation from the Army by $900 (on a base of $32,000). Years enrolled effects are larger and earnings effects more negative for veterans with lower AFQT scores and those who were less occupationally skilled. Under a variety of conservative assumptions, veterans are unlikely to recoup these reduced earnings during their working careers. All veterans who were already enrolled in college at the time of bill passage increase their months of schooling, but only for those in public institutions did this translate into increases in bachelor’s degree attainment and longer-run earnings. For specific groups of students, large subsidies can modestly help degree completion but harm long run earnings due to lost labor market experience.

Suggested Citation

Barr, Andrew and Kawano, Laura and Sacerdote, Bruce and Skimmyhorn, William and Stevens, Michael, You Can't Handle the Truth: The Effects of the Post-9/11 Gi Bill on Higher Education and Earnings (July 2021). NBER Working Paper No. w29024, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3889130

Andrew Barr (Contact Author)

Texas A&M University

Langford Building A
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College Station, TX 77843-3137
United States

Laura Kawano

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor ( email )

500 S. State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States

Bruce Sacerdote

Dartmouth College - Department of Economics ( email )

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603-646-2122 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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William Skimmyhorn

Mason School of Business, College of William & Mary ( email )

Williamsburg, VA
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://mason.wm.edu/faculty/directory/full-time-faculty/skimmyhorn_w.php

U.S. Army Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis ( email )

West Point, NY
United States

Michael Stevens

U.S. Department of the Treasury ( email )

1500 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20220
United States

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