Do Collateral Sanctions Work? Evidence from the Irs’ Passport Certification and Revocation Process

55 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2021 Last revised: 27 Apr 2025

See all articles by Paul R. Organ

Paul R. Organ

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor

Alexander Ruda

Government of the United States of America - Internal Revenue Service (IRS)

Joel B. Slemrod

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Alex Turk

Government of the United States of America - Internal Revenue Service (IRS)

Date Written: July 2021

Abstract

Penalties for tax evasion are typically financial, but many jurisdictions also utilize collateral sanctions that deny access to some government-provided service. To learn about the effectiveness of such penalties, we examine a U.S. policy restricting passport access for taxpayers with substantial tax debt, known as “certification.” We find an immediate and strong positive effect on compliance actions when a passport request is denied. We then take advantage of randomization during the policy rollout to identify the direct compliance effect of certification, and find smaller but non-trivial effects whose heterogeneity is consistent with measures of taxpayers’ value of having a passport.

Suggested Citation

Organ, Paul and Ruda, Alexander and Slemrod, Joel B. and Turk, Alex, Do Collateral Sanctions Work? Evidence from the Irs’ Passport Certification and Revocation Process (July 2021). NBER Working Paper No. w29029, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3889135

Paul Organ (Contact Author)

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor ( email )

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Alexander Ruda

Government of the United States of America - Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ( email )

1111 Constitution Avenue, NW
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Joel B. Slemrod

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Alex Turk

Government of the United States of America - Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ( email )

1111 Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20224
United States

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