Regulating for Loyalty in the Financial Services Industry

(2021) 38 Company & Securities Law Journal 355

24 Pages Posted: 22 Jul 2021

See all articles by Rosemary Teele Langford

Rosemary Teele Langford

University of Melbourne - Law School

M. Scott Donald

UNSW Law

Samuel Walpole

TC Beirne School of Law

Date Written: June 10, 2021

Abstract

A series of scandals in the financial services sector over the past twelve years has inspired concerted legislative action to protect customer interests. The Future of Financial Advice, Stronger Super, Protecting Consumers and Member Outcomes initiatives have each sought to reform the duties of loyalty, as variously expressed, owed by the providers of financial advice, superannuation funds and mortgage broking services to their customers. This article compares the legal regimes emerging from those initiatives with each other and with three other, analogous regimes: that applying to registered managed investment schemes, that applying to life insurers, and that applying to corporate directors generally. It finds that although similarly motivated, both the substance and the modality of the regimes vary. This variation needs to be acknowledged and respected when considering the operation of the regimes.

Keywords: fiduciary duties, directors' duties, loyalty, financial advisers, superannuation, mortgage broking, financial services regulation

JEL Classification: K10, K20, K22

Suggested Citation

Langford, Rosemary Teele and Donald, M. Scott and Walpole, Samuel, Regulating for Loyalty in the Financial Services Industry (June 10, 2021). (2021) 38 Company & Securities Law Journal 355, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3889903

Rosemary Teele Langford (Contact Author)

University of Melbourne - Law School ( email )

University Square
185 Pelham Street, Carlton
Victoria, Victoria 3010
Australia

M. Scott Donald

UNSW Law ( email )

Kensington, New South Wales 2052
Australia

Samuel Walpole

TC Beirne School of Law ( email )

Australia

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