Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers: A Retrospective on Retrospectives

Forthcoming in Journal of Competition Law & Economics

26 Pages Posted: 22 Jul 2021 Last revised: 27 Mar 2024

See all articles by Annika Stöhr

Annika Stöhr

Ilmenau University of Technology

Date Written: March 20, 2024

Abstract

This comprehensive review of ex-post merger studies assesses the price effects of horizontal transactions to determine whether there are common post-merger price effects, both overall and in specific markets. The aim is to derive implications for policy makers and competition authorities in terms of effective merger enforcement and competition policy. By combining and further analysing the results of 52 retrospective studies on 82 mergers or horizontal transactions, it can be shown that the sector in which the respective transaction takes place alone is not a strong indicator of the direction of price-related merger effects. In contrast, the ‘size’ or ‘importance’ of a transaction, as well as market concentration seem to be correlated with post-transaction price increases, especially in already highly concentrated markets.

Overall, this meta-study shows the importance of ex-post case studies for improving ex-ante merger control: although generalisations can only be made with caution, the subsequent analysis of a case and its ex-post observable outcome can provide useful information for future merger enforcement in general, either in the same industry and/or with similar case characteristics, as well as for competition policy regulators.

Keywords: Antitrust, Merger Control, Industrial Economics, Retrospective Studies, Ex-Post Studies, Competition Law Enforcement

JEL Classification: D49, K21, L13, L40

Suggested Citation

Stöhr, Annika, Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers: A Retrospective on Retrospectives (March 20, 2024). Forthcoming in Journal of Competition Law & Economics , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3890264 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3890264

Annika Stöhr (Contact Author)

Ilmenau University of Technology ( email )

Ilmenau, D-98684
Germany

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