Teacher Compensation and Structural Inequality: Evidence from Centralized Teacher School Choice in Perú

85 Pages Posted: 26 Jul 2021 Last revised: 4 Dec 2024

See all articles by Matteo Bobba

Matteo Bobba

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Tim Ederer

University of Toulouse

Gianmarco León-Ciliotta

Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE); Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona; CEPR

Christopher Neilson

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; Princeton University - Princeton School of Public and International Affairs

Marco Nieddu

Universita di Cagliari

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2021

Abstract

We exploit data on the universe of public-school teachers and students in Perú to establish that wage rigidity makes teachers choose schools based on non-pecuniary factors, magnifying the existing urban-rural gap in student achievement. Leveraging a reform in the teacher compensation structure, we provide causal evidence that increasing salaries in less desirable locations is effective at improving student learning by attracting higher-quality teachers. We then build and estimate a model of teacher sorting across schools and student achievement production, whereby teachers are heterogeneous in their preferences over non-wage attributes and their comparative advantages in teaching different student types. Counterfactual compensation policies that leverage information about teachers’ preferences and value-added can result in a substantially more efficient and equitable allocation by inducing teachers to sort based on their comparative advantage.

Suggested Citation

Bobba, Matteo and Ederer, Tim and León-Ciliotta, Gianmarco and Neilson, Christopher and Nieddu, Marco, Teacher Compensation and Structural Inequality: Evidence from Centralized Teacher School Choice in Perú (July 2021). NBER Working Paper No. w29068, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3893349

Matteo Bobba (Contact Author)

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

Tim Ederer

University of Toulouse

Gianmarco León-Ciliotta

Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
(+34) 93 542-1757 (Phone)
(+34) 93 542-1746 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/gianmarcoleon/

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, Catalonia 08014
Spain

Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

CEPR ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Christopher Neilson

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

Princeton University - Princeton School of Public and International Affairs ( email )

Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

Marco Nieddu

Universita di Cagliari

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