Domestic Pressure and International Climate Cooperation

Annual Review of Resource Economics, forthcoming

28 Pages Posted: 2 Aug 2021

See all articles by Alessandro Tavoni

Alessandro Tavoni

University of Bologna; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Ralph Winkler

University of Bern - Department of Economics; University of Bern - Oeschger Centre for Climate Change Research

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 28, 2021

Abstract

In the wake of 25 UN Climate Change Conferences of the Parties (and counting), international cooperation on mitigating greenhouse gas emissions to avoid substantial and potentially irreversible climate change remains an important challenge. The limited impact that the Kyoto Protocol has had on curbing emissions, and the gap between the ambitions of its successor and the Paris Agreement's lack of sanctioning mechanisms for addressing non-compliance, demonstrates both the difficulties in negotiating ambitious environmental agreements and the reluctance of countries to comply with their agreed emission targets once they have joined the treaty. Therefore, a better understanding of the obstacles and opportunities that the interactions between domestic and international policy pose for the design of successful international climate cooperation is of utmost importance. To shed light on the roots of the stalemate (and suggest possible ways out), this article reviews, and draws lessons from, a growing theoretical, experimental and empirical literature that accounts for the hierarchical interplay between domestic political pressure and international climate policy.

Keywords: international climate cooperation, hierarchical policy-making, domestic pressure, special interest groups, (strategic) delegation

JEL Classification: D72, P48, Q54, Q58

Suggested Citation

Tavoni, Alessandro and Winkler, Ralph, Domestic Pressure and International Climate Cooperation (July 28, 2021). Annual Review of Resource Economics, forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3895088

Alessandro Tavoni

University of Bologna ( email )

Bologna
Italy
0512098485 (Phone)
40100 (Fax)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/whosWho/Staff/AlessandroTavoni.aspx

Ralph Winkler (Contact Author)

University of Bern - Department of Economics ( email )

Schanzeneckstrasse 1
Bern, 3001
Switzerland
+41 31 631 4508 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ralph-winkler.de

University of Bern - Oeschger Centre for Climate Change Research ( email )

Zähringerstrasse 25
Bern, 3012
Switzerland

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