Do Sellers Benefit from Sponsored Product Listings? Evidence from an Online Marketplace

60 Pages Posted: 18 Aug 2021 Last revised: 9 Sep 2022

See all articles by Mingyu Joo

Mingyu Joo

University of California, Riverside - School of Business

Jiaqi Shi

University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business

Vibhanshu Abhishek

Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management

Date Written: August 25, 2022

Abstract

Sponsored product listings on online marketplaces are third-party sellers’ ads blended in organic product listings. This paper investigates a seller’s managerial question: whether a sponsored listing outperforms an organic listing, and how the performance varies by positions. Our large-scale field study on a mobile app with experimental and natural variation shows that consumers avoid clicking or purchasing advertised products in the prime positions, yet the ad avoidance attenuates in the lower positions. A series of mechanism checks suggest that consumers perceive organic product listings in the prime positions to be high quality products. However, an ROI analysis predicts that an advertising seller can be financially better off, if an organic listing in a non-prime position is replaced with a sponsored listing in a prime position. The findings suggest that a seller can benefit from sponsored listings by position relocation, but not by visual prominence at a given position.

Keywords: Sponsored Listings, Online Marketplace, Field Experiment, Native Ads, Ad Avoidance

Suggested Citation

Joo, Mingyu and Shi, Jiaqi and Abhishek, Vibhanshu, Do Sellers Benefit from Sponsored Product Listings? Evidence from an Online Marketplace (August 25, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3896716 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3896716

Mingyu Joo (Contact Author)

University of California, Riverside - School of Business ( email )

900 University Ave.
Riverside, CA 92521
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.mingyujoo.com

Jiaqi Shi

University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business ( email )

Paul Merage School of Business
Irvine, CA California 92697-3125
United States

Vibhanshu Abhishek

Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

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