Teacher Compensation and Structural Inequality: Evidence from Centralized Teacher School Choice in Perú

66 Pages Posted: 31 Jul 2021

See all articles by Matteo Bobba

Matteo Bobba

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Tim Ederer

University of Toulouse

Gianmarco León-Ciliotta

Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE); Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona; CEPR

Christopher Neilson

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; Princeton University - Princeton School of Public and International Affairs

Marco Nieddu

Universita di Cagliari

Abstract

This paper studies how increasing teacher compensation at hard-to-staff schools can reduce inequality in access to qualifed teachers. Leveraging an unconditional change in the teacher compensation structure in Perú, we first show causal evidence that increasing salaries at less desirable locations attracts better quality applicants and improves student test scores. We then estimate a model of teacher preferences over local amenities, school characteristics, and wages using geocoded job postings and rich application data from the nationwide centralized teacher assignment system. Our estimated model suggests that the current policy is both inefficient and not large enough to effectively undo the inequality of initial conditions that hard-to-staff schools and their communities face. Counterfactual analyses that incorporate equilibrium sorting effects characterize alternative wage schedules and quantify the cost of reducing structural inequality in the allocation of teacher talent across schools.

JEL Classification: J31, J45, I21, C93, O15

Suggested Citation

Bobba, Matteo and Ederer, Tim and León-Ciliotta, Gianmarco and Neilson, Christopher and Nieddu, Marco, Teacher Compensation and Structural Inequality: Evidence from Centralized Teacher School Choice in Perú. IZA Discussion Paper No. 14581, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3896793 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3896793

Matteo Bobba (Contact Author)

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

Tim Ederer

University of Toulouse

Gianmarco León-Ciliotta

Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
(+34) 93 542-1757 (Phone)
(+34) 93 542-1746 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/gianmarcoleon/

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, Catalonia 08014
Spain

Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

CEPR ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Christopher Neilson

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

Princeton University - Princeton School of Public and International Affairs ( email )

Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

Marco Nieddu

Universita di Cagliari

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