Download This PaperStrong Nash Equilibria and the Potential Maximizer
13 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 1997
Date Written: February 23, 1996
Abstract
A class of non cooperative games characterized by a "congestion effect" is studied, in which there exists a strong Nash equilibrium, and the set of Nash equilibria, the set of strong Nash equilibria and the set of strategy profiles maximizing the potential function coincide. The structure of the class is investigated and it turns out that this class constitutes a cone. Remarks on strictly strong Nash equilibria and relaxations are provided.
JEL Classification: C71
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
van Megen, Freek and Facchini, Giovanni and Borm, Peter E. M. and Tijs, Stef H., Strong Nash Equilibria and the Potential Maximizer (February 23, 1996). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=38981 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.38981
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