Capacity Design in School Choice

31 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2021 Last revised: 8 Sep 2021

See all articles by Umut Dur

Umut Dur

North Carolina State University

Martin Van der Linden

Emory University

Date Written: August 3, 2021

Abstract

We study a new variant of the school choice problem in which capacities can be altered by distributing additional seats across schools in response to students’ reported preferences. We show that heuristics solutions to this capacity design problem can be inefficient, even if they focus on allocating seats to the most demanded schools. However, we introduce a simple myopic algorithm that characterizes the set of efficient matchings among those that respect priorities.

Keywords: School Choice, Matching Theory

JEL Classification: C78, D47, D82, I20

Suggested Citation

Dur, Umut and Van der Linden, Martin, Capacity Design in School Choice (August 3, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3898719 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3898719

Umut Dur

North Carolina State University ( email )

Hillsborough Street
Raleigh, NC 27695
United States

Martin Van der Linden (Contact Author)

Emory University ( email )

201 Dowman Drive
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States

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