Scripting the Mechanics of the Benchmark Manipulation Corporate Scandals: The ‘Guardian’ Paradox

Jordanoska A, Lord N. Scripting the mechanics of the benchmark manipulation corporate scandals: The ‘guardian’ paradox. European Journal of Criminology. 2020;17(1):9-30.

King's College London Law School Research Paper Forthcoming

34 Pages Posted: 1 Sep 2021

See all articles by Aleksandra Jordanoska

Aleksandra Jordanoska

King's College London - The Dickson Poon School of Law

Nicholas Lord

University of Manchester

Date Written: July 12, 2019

Abstract

This article implements a crime script analysis to understand the procedural dynamics of corporate benchmark-rigging in the financial services industry. In 2012 several global banks were implicated in the manipulation of various trading benchmarks, portraying the industry as affected by serious, pervasive and ‘organized’ corporate crimes. Yet their dynamics have been relatively little studied by criminologists. To address this gap, we analyse official enforcement documentation, supplemented with data from interviews with key informants in the UK financial markets. We analyse the range of interactions between the relevant actors, their actions and the resources essential to the manipulations, and deconstruct the benchmark manipulations into four scenes (calculated positioning and identification of co-collaborators; recruitment; (ephemeral) manipulation; recompense and solicitation). The analysis reveals that regulatory and organizational systems play a paradoxical role of both ‘capable guardians’ and ‘facilitators of misconduct’; this has implications for criminological theory.

Suggested Citation

Jordanoska, Aleksandra and Lord, Nicholas, Scripting the Mechanics of the Benchmark Manipulation Corporate Scandals: The ‘Guardian’ Paradox (July 12, 2019). Jordanoska A, Lord N. Scripting the mechanics of the benchmark manipulation corporate scandals: The ‘guardian’ paradox. European Journal of Criminology. 2020;17(1):9-30., King's College London Law School Research Paper Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900490 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3900490

Aleksandra Jordanoska (Contact Author)

King's College London - The Dickson Poon School of Law ( email )

Somerset House East Wing
Strand
London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

Nicholas Lord

University of Manchester

Oxford Road
Manchester, M13 9PL
United Kingdom

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