Undergraduate Course Allocation through Competitive Markets
60 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2021 Last revised: 8 Aug 2023
Date Written: June 8, 2021
We consider the problem of allocating courses to students in post-secondary institutions. We propose a mechanism that assigns course seats based on student preferences and respects course priorities. This mechanism uses fake money and competitive equilibrium to allocate courses without transfers and has desirable theoretical properties in terms of stability, efficiency, fairness, and strategy-proofness. In simulations drawing from real-world university data, we demonstrate that its outcomes improve student satisfaction and allocation fairness over the outcomes of several celebrated mechanisms.
Keywords: market design, matching, many-to-many assignment, deterministic assignment, course allocation, approximate competitive equilibrium, random serial dictatorship, set-asides
JEL Classification: D47, D63, D82, C63, C78, I21
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