Undergraduate Course Allocation through Competitive Markets

59 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2021 Last revised: 6 Jul 2022

See all articles by Daniel Kornbluth

Daniel Kornbluth

Carnegie Mellon University

Alexey Kushnir

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business

Date Written: June 8, 2021

Abstract

We consider a many-to-many matching problem with a priority structure such as the one in undergraduate course allocation. We develop a deterministic market mechanism based on the approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes that allocates courses to students based on student preferences and respects course priorities. The novel mechanism has desirable theoretical properties in terms of stability, efficiency, fairness, and strategy-proofness. In simulated environments, its outcomes increase student mean utility and allocation fairness as compared to the outcomes of the celebrated deferred acceptance mechanisms with single and multiple tie-breakings, as well as to the outcomes of the widely used random serial dictatorship with set-asides.

Keywords: market design, matching, many-to-many assignment, deterministic assignment, course allocation, approximate competitive equilibrium, random serial dictatorship, set-asides

JEL Classification: D47, D63, D82, C63, C78, I21

Suggested Citation

Kornbluth, Daniel and Kushnir, Alexey I., Undergraduate Course Allocation through Competitive Markets (June 8, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3901146 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3901146

Daniel Kornbluth

Carnegie Mellon University ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

Alexey I. Kushnir (Contact Author)

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business ( email )

5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
111
Abstract Views
425
rank
343,524
PlumX Metrics