Antitrust Compliance: Collusion

in D. Sokol and B. Van Rooij eds, The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance (Cambridge University Press, 2021).

Posted: 13 Sep 2021

See all articles by Johannes Paha

Johannes Paha

Dept. of Economics (VWL I)

Florence Thépot

University of Glasgow

Date Written: January 1, 2021

Abstract

Focusing on collusive behavior, this chapter outlines the complexity associated with both the ex ante design of antitrust compliance programs and the ex post assessment of their impact. Following an interdisciplinary review of relevant literature, the chapter provides a structured cost–benefit approach to compliance and challenges the idea that compliance cannot be rationalized. We recognize that measurement of compliance programs may be particularly difficult in light of the importance of less-tangible factors such as corporate culture.

Yet, the chapter proposes that a principled approach to compliance would considerably support the work of practitioners. Future research should concentrate on studying the interaction effects of compliance mechanisms and corporate culture. Such large-scale empirical studies on individual and firm-specific factors of compliance might be promoted and coordinated by competition authorities.

Keywords: Antitrust, Compliance, Competition Law

JEL Classification: L40, L41, L49, K21

Suggested Citation

Paha, Johannes and Thépot, Florence, Antitrust Compliance: Collusion (January 1, 2021). in D. Sokol and B. Van Rooij eds, The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance (Cambridge University Press, 2021)., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3902443

Johannes Paha

Dept. of Economics (VWL I) ( email )

Licher Strasse 62
Giessen, 35394
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.uni-giessen.de/fbz/fb02/fb/professuren/vwl/goetz/kontakt/mitarbeiter/pahaordner

Florence Thépot (Contact Author)

University of Glasgow ( email )

5-9 The Square
University of Glasgow
Glasgow, G12 8QQ
United Kingdom

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