Redeeming SPACs

58 Pages Posted: 19 Aug 2021 Last revised: 23 Mar 2022

See all articles by Usha Rodrigues

Usha Rodrigues

University of Georgia School of Law

Mike Stegemoller

Baylor University

Date Written: 2021

Abstract

Special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) have exploded in popularity, luring both adventurous retail investors and sophisticated institutional investors. In a SPAC, a publicly traded shell corporation acquires a private target, thereby taking it public in a manner that circumvents the rigors of a traditional initial public offering (IPO). Proponents vaunt SPACs’ ability to simplify the process of accessing the public markets and democratize capitalism, but in their current form they pose risks to retail investors and to the market as a whole. Using a hand-collected dataset, this Article fills a gap in the literature by providing new empirical data regarding a critical feature of SPACs—the redemption right. SPACs allow their shareholders to vote for an acquisition target while simultaneously pulling their money out—a species of empty voting, where a vote is decoupled from any economic substance. We document a disturbing level of empty voting in SPACs and demonstrate an inverse correlation with stock performance: SPACs with more empty voting perform worse. Backed by this empirical support, we propose a tailored reform that we believe could make SPACs a viable and valuable alternative to traditional IPOs.

Keywords: Ipos, spacs, securities

JEL Classification: K22

Suggested Citation

Rodrigues, Usha and Stegemoller, Michael A., Redeeming SPACs (2021). University of Georgia School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2021-09, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3906196 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3906196

Usha Rodrigues (Contact Author)

University of Georgia School of Law ( email )

225 Herty Drive
Athens, GA 30602
United States
706-242-5562 (Phone)

Michael A. Stegemoller

Baylor University ( email )

P.O. Box 98004
Waco, TX 76798-8004
United States
254-710-4145 (Phone)

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