Pharmaceutical Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and Chile

Journal of Law and Biosciences 2021

7 Pages Posted: 17 Aug 2021

See all articles by Michael A. Carrier

Michael A. Carrier

Rutgers Law School

Fernando Araya

Facultad de Derecho Universidad Diego Portales

Date Written: May 19, 2021

Abstract

Consumers suffer from high drug prices, which stem in large part from pharmaceutical companies’ anticompetitive games. This essay discusses the crucial role antitrust enforcement agencies can play in addressing pay-for-delay settlements and product hopping and draws lessons from this enforcement.

In particular, it explains how, learning from the experience with U.S. pay-for-delay settlements, the Chilean National Economic Prosecutor’s Office (FNE) should consider the potential downsides from exclusivity periods that make it easier for brand firms to keep generics off the market. And it explains how the Federal Trade Commission and FNE can target product hopping that makes no sense other than by harming the generic.

Keywords: pay-for-delay settlements, product hopping, FTC, FNE

JEL Classification: I18, K21, L40, L41, L43, L65, O34, O38

Suggested Citation

Carrier, Michael A. and Araya, Fernando, Pharmaceutical Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and Chile (May 19, 2021). Journal of Law and Biosciences 2021, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3906884

Michael A. Carrier (Contact Author)

Rutgers Law School ( email )

217 North Fifth Street
Camden, NJ 08102-1203
United States
856-225-6380 (Phone)
856-225-6516 (Fax)

Fernando Araya

Facultad de Derecho Universidad Diego Portales ( email )

Vergara 210
Santiago, Santiag
Chile

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