Monopoly and Monopsony: Antitrust Standing, Injury, and Damages

44 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2021

See all articles by Tirza Angerhofer

Tirza Angerhofer

University of Florida - Warrington College of Business Administration - Department of Economics; Duke University - Department of Economics

Roger D. Blair

University of Florida

Date Written: June 23, 2020

Abstract

This article examines the economic consequences of collusion in both the output market and one of the input markets. We examine the results of sequential collusion, which leads to complications and inconsistencies in measuring antitrust damages. We also examine simultaneous collusion in both the input and output markets. Ultimately, the profit maximizing equilibrium are identical but there are complications along the way to the final collusive equilibrium. The article explores the private plaintiff problems involving antitrust standing, proving antitrust injury, and estimating antitrust damages.

Keywords: monopoly, monopsony, antitrust economics

JEL Classification: K21, L12

Suggested Citation

Angerhofer, Tirza and Blair, Roger D., Monopoly and Monopsony: Antitrust Standing, Injury, and Damages (June 23, 2020). University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, No. 2, 2021, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3907361

Tirza Angerhofer (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Warrington College of Business Administration - Department of Economics ( email )

Gainesville, FL 32611-7140
United States

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

213 Social Sciences Building
Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

Roger D. Blair

University of Florida ( email )

342 Matherly Hall
Gainesville, FL 32611-7140
United States
352-392-0179 (Phone)
352-392-7860 (Fax)

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