Do Hedge Funds Strategically Misreport Their Holdings? Evidence from 13F Restatements

52 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2021 Last revised: 26 May 2023

See all articles by Sean Cao

Sean Cao

University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business

Zhi Da

University of Notre Dame - Mendoza College of Business

Daniel Jiang

University of Waterloo - School of Accounting and Finance

Baozhong Yang

Georgia State University - J. Mack Robinson College of Business

Date Written: September 12, 2022

Abstract

Hedge funds can subsequently amend their originally reported 13F quarterly holdings using restatements. We conduct the first systematic analysis of such filings, which are as common as confidential filings (used by funds to delay holding disclosures) but affect four times as many stocks. Restated holdings are associated with significant abnormal returns, suggesting that some original holdings are strategically misreported to hide funds' trading intentions, and later, restatements are filed to encourage copycat trading. We construct a restatement return gap measure to gauge the value added by such restatements and find it to predict future fund performance in real time.

Keywords: Strategic Disclosure, Hedge Funds, Ownership Disclosure, 13F Holdings, Restatement, Fund Skill

JEL Classification: G10, G19

Suggested Citation

Cao, Sean S. and Da, Zhi and Jiang, Xin and Yang, Baozhong, Do Hedge Funds Strategically Misreport Their Holdings? Evidence from 13F Restatements (September 12, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3907560 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3907560

Sean S. Cao

University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business ( email )

College Park, MD 20742-1815
United States

Zhi Da

University of Notre Dame - Mendoza College of Business ( email )

Notre Dame, IN 46556-5646
United States

Xin Jiang (Contact Author)

University of Waterloo - School of Accounting and Finance ( email )

200 University Avenue West
Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1 N2L 3G1
Canada

Baozhong Yang

Georgia State University - J. Mack Robinson College of Business ( email )

35 Broad St NW
Atlanta, GA Ga 30303-3083
United States
4044137350 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/baozhongyang/home

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