The Perils of Authoritarian Presidentialism: Stumbling Towards Authoritarian Constitutionalism in Eurasia

29 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2021 Last revised: 14 Jan 2022

See all articles by Julian G. Waller

Julian G. Waller

George Washington University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: January 13, 2022

Abstract

Hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes in post-Soviet Eurasia have been increasingly experimenting at the margins with alternative institutional forms beyond inherited democratic structures, yet so far with only minor success. Tinkering with different constitutional formats is likely to continue in the coming decades, especially as the constitutional position of representative legislatures ensures that such electorally-connected remain uncomfortable, latent threats to long-term authoritarian stability. Efforts to structurally deviate from the ‘standard model’ of liberal democratic constitutional schemas derived from the 1990s-era democratization pressures has already been observed in several states, including Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. More ambitious structural format changes are likely, especially in the form of newly constitutionalized conciliar and advisory bodies, which are also increasingly associated with the institutionalization of stable leader succession rules. Combined with formally disempowering elected legislatures vis-à-vis the executive, these new developments may prove to be more congruent with long-standing electoral authoritarian regimes’ preferences regarding the formalization of authoritarian political orders over the medium- and long-term.

Keywords: authoritarianism, constitutionalism, presidentialism, post-Soviet, Eurasia

Suggested Citation

Waller, Julian G., The Perils of Authoritarian Presidentialism: Stumbling Towards Authoritarian Constitutionalism in Eurasia (January 13, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3909084 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3909084

Julian G. Waller (Contact Author)

George Washington University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Washington, DC 20052
United States

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