Conflict in the Pool: A Field Experiment

17 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2021

See all articles by Loukas Balafoutas

Loukas Balafoutas

University of Innsbruck

Marco Faravelli

The University of Queensland

Roman M. Sheremeta

Case Western Reserve University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 25, 2021

Abstract

We conduct a field experiment on conflict in swimming pools. When all lanes are occupied, an actor joins the least crowded lane and asks one of the swimmers to move to another lane. The lane represents a contested scarce resource. We vary the actor’s valuation (high and low) for the good through the message they deliver. Also, we take advantage of the natural variation in the number of swimmers to proxy for their valuation. Consistent with theoretical predictions, a swimmer’s propensity to engage in conflict increases in scarcity (incentive effect) and decreases in the actor’s valuation (discouragement effect). We complement the results with survey evidence.

Keywords: conflict; conflict resolution; field experiment.

JEL Classification: C72, C93, D74, D91

Suggested Citation

Balafoutas, Loukas and Faravelli, Marco and Sheremeta, Roman M., Conflict in the Pool: A Field Experiment (August 25, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3911500 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3911500

Loukas Balafoutas

University of Innsbruck ( email )

Universitätsstraße 15
Innsbruck, Innsbruck 6020
Austria

Marco Faravelli (Contact Author)

The University of Queensland ( email )

Australia

Roman M. Sheremeta

Case Western Reserve University ( email )

10900 Euclid Ave.
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States

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