Do Employees Cheer for Private Equity? The Heterogeneous Effects of Buyouts on Job Quality

90 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2021 Last revised: 14 Feb 2022

See all articles by Will Gornall

Will Gornall

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business

Oleg Gredil

Tulane University - A.B. Freeman School of Business

Sabrina T Howell

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Xing Liu

Tsinghua University - PBC School of Finance

Jason Sockin

Cornell University, Ithaca, New York; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: December 24, 2021

Abstract

We show that private equity leveraged buyouts (LBOs) reduce perceived job quality despite not impacting average base pay. This appears to reflect higher risk for employees. Both job quality and employee incentive pay are more related to firm performance at private equity-owned companies than at public control firms, with 1% higher deal IRR associated with 0.7% more employee incentive pay. Also, higher leverage deals and employees with worse outside options and longer tenure drive the post-LBO satisfaction declines. Our results highlight how job quality is tied to job security and how ownership affects employees through mechanisms beyond base pay.

Keywords: private equity, leveraged buyouts, job quality, employees, corporate culture, non-pecuniary amenities, implicit contracts

JEL Classification: G24, G32, J31, J32

Suggested Citation

Gornall, Will and Gredil, Oleg and Howell, Sabrina T and Liu, Xing and Sockin, Jason, Do Employees Cheer for Private Equity? The Heterogeneous Effects of Buyouts on Job Quality (December 24, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3912230 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3912230

Will Gornall

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://willgornall.com

Oleg Gredil

Tulane University - A.B. Freeman School of Business ( email )

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Sabrina T Howell (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Xing Liu

Tsinghua University - PBC School of Finance ( email )

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Beijing, 100083
China

HOME PAGE: http://www.xing-liu.com/

Jason Sockin

Cornell University, Ithaca, New York ( email )

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Ithaca, NY Tompkins County 14853
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

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Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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