Would 'Medicare for All' Mean Quality for All? How Public-Option Principles Could Reverse Medicare's Negative Impact on Quality

78 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2021 Last revised: 8 Apr 2022

Date Written: August 26, 2021

Abstract

Medicare has had a negative impact on health care quality. By the time Congress created Medicare in 1965, research had demonstrated many U.S. physicians and hospitals were providing medical care that was so low-quality as to be dangerous to patients’ health. Congress nonetheless incorporated into the new program features that ensured traditional Medicare would exacerbate existing quality problems. Research accordingly continued to document widespread quality problems, in particular those forms of low-quality care that traditional Medicare rewards with higher payments. Congress and Medicare administrators have resisted correcting these perverse incentives. Only in recent years has Congress attempted to emulate payment rules and quality-improvement tools private insurers have developed, though these efforts have had little if any effect. Congress can reverse Medicare’s negative impact on quality by applying “public option” principles to Medicare, such that traditional Medicare and private insurers compete on as level a playing field as possible.

Note:
Funding Information: None

Declaration of Interests: None

Keywords: health care, health reform, health care quality, innovation, medical errors, harmful medicine, public choice, rent-seeking, public option, competition, payment reform, pay for performance, value-based purchasing, regulatory capture, health disparities, structural racism, insurance reform, Medicare

JEL Classification: D7, D70, D72, D73, D78, I1, I10, I11, I13, I14, I18, I19, I38, H4, H40, H41, H42, H43, H44, H5, H50,

Suggested Citation

Cannon, Michael F. and Pohida, Jacqueline, Would 'Medicare for All' Mean Quality for All? How Public-Option Principles Could Reverse Medicare's Negative Impact on Quality (August 26, 2021). Quinnipiac Health Law Journal, Vol. 25, 2022, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3912767 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3912767

Michael F. Cannon (Contact Author)

Cato Institute ( email )

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Jacqueline Pohida

Researcher ( email )

450 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Apt. 205
Washington, DC 20001
United States
20001 (Fax)

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