Matching with Subjective and Objective Evaluations

15 Pages Posted: 2 Sep 2021 Last revised: 10 Nov 2021

See all articles by Yuanju Fang

Yuanju Fang

Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, Students

Yosuke Yasuda

Osaka University - Graduate School of Economics

Date Written: August 31, 2021

Abstract

There are matching markets in which objective evaluations such as exam scores, skill qualifications, and priorities, are available in addition to subjective evaluations over agents. To examine these situations, we extend a college admission model by allowing that colleges have two different types of ordinal rankings over students, i.e., common priority order and individual preferences. A matching is called double stable if it is both priority stable and preference stable. While the existence of a double stable matching is not always guaranteed, we provide its characterization through the existing well-known mechanisms in the literature; a double stable matching exists if and only if the resulting outcome of the serial dictatorship mechanism coincides with that of the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism.

Keywords: matching, objective evaluation, priority, double stability.

JEL Classification: C78, D47.

Suggested Citation

Fang, Yuanju and Yasuda, Yosuke, Matching with Subjective and Objective Evaluations (August 31, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3914551 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3914551

Yuanju Fang

Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, Students ( email )

Osaka Prefecture
Japan

Yosuke Yasuda (Contact Author)

Osaka University - Graduate School of Economics ( email )

1-7 Machikaneyama
Toyonaka, Osaka, 560-0043
Japan

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