Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores: A Comment

6 Pages Posted: 23 May 2003

Date Written: April 2003

Abstract

In this paper we provide an alternative to the generalized model of indivisible good allocation available in Sonmez [1991]. In this context we prove a theorem that gives sufficient conditions for an allocation rule to be weakly coalitionally strategy-proof. We also prove that with existence of a Pareto optimal allocation rule along with another condition introduced in this paper, is sufficient for essentially single-valued Pareto correspondence and hence is also sufficient for essentially single-valued core correspondence, in the presence of a mild domain assumption.

JEL Classification: D71

Suggested Citation

Lahiri, Somdeb, Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores: A Comment (April 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=391462 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.391462

Somdeb Lahiri (Contact Author)

Lok Jagruti (LJ) University ( email )

S.G. Road & Kataria Motors
Sarkhej Circle
Ahmedabad, IN Gujarat 382210
India

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/somdeblahiri/home

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