Misalignment between Test Scores and Colleges' Preferences: Chinese College Admission Reconsidered

33 Pages Posted: 2 Sep 2021 Last revised: 15 Nov 2021

See all articles by Yuanju Fang

Yuanju Fang

Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, Students

Yosuke Yasuda

The University of Osaka - Graduate School of Economics

Date Written: August 31, 2021

Abstract

Each year, millions of high school graduates in China take a standardized test and compete for college seats. Unlike other countries, college admissions in China have a distinct feature: both test scores and colleges’ preferences coexist in the market. To alleviate the misalignment problem between test scores and colleges’ preferences, the government implements a so-called "dummy quota policy". The Chinese parallel (CP) mechanism, based on this policy, is a variant of the serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism but has various drawbacks. In this paper, we consider two scenarios depending on whether the dummy quota policy is maintained or abandoned. For each scenario, we propose a modified parallel mechanism to improve the allocation outcome of the CP mechanism.

Keywords: college admission, parallel mechanism, test score, double stability.

JEL Classification: C78, D47.

Suggested Citation

Fang, Yuanju and Yasuda, Yosuke, Misalignment between Test Scores and Colleges' Preferences: Chinese College Admission Reconsidered (August 31, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3914742 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3914742

Yuanju Fang

Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, Students ( email )

Osaka Prefecture
Japan

Yosuke Yasuda (Contact Author)

The University of Osaka - Graduate School of Economics ( email )

1-7 Machikaneyama
Toyonaka, Osaka, 560-0043
Japan

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