The Digital Markets Act and Private Enforcement: Proposals for an Optimal System of Enforcement

Eleanor M. Fox Liber Amicorum, Antitrust Ambassador to the World (Concurrences, 2021), Forthcoming

14 Pages Posted: 31 Aug 2021 Last revised: 1 Sep 2021

See all articles by Assimakis Komninos

Assimakis Komninos

University College London - Faculty of Laws

Date Written: August 31, 2021

Abstract

The DMA Proposal is silent about private enforcement, although the general view takes this as granted. Indeed, as the Commission’s Proposal currently stands, national courts would apply Articles 5 and 6 and enforce the related obligations in civil litigation. However, the prospect of unlimited private enforcement raises concerns about fragmentation, especially in view of the novel nature of the DMA rules. For this reason, the EU legislator would be well-advised to introduce certain limitations on private enforcement and provide for a rule of precedence for public enforcement. Private enforcement should be allowed in its follow-on but not in its stand-alone form. This limitation could be revisited after a number of years and once a body of precedent on the DMA has been built. The DMA should also include concrete mechanisms of co-ordination and co-operation with the European Commission, with a view to safeguarding the consistent application of its rules in the Union.

Suggested Citation

Komninos, Assimakis, The Digital Markets Act and Private Enforcement: Proposals for an Optimal System of Enforcement (August 31, 2021). Eleanor M. Fox Liber Amicorum, Antitrust Ambassador to the World (Concurrences, 2021), Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3914932 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3914932

Assimakis Komninos (Contact Author)

University College London - Faculty of Laws ( email )

Gower St
London WC1E OEG, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/clge/academics.shtml?z_komninos

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