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The One Period Problem of a Monopoly Incentive Compatible Equity and Debt-linked Contracts

30 Pages Posted: 26 Apr 2003  

Ayi Gavriel Ayayi

Université du Québec

Date Written: April 24, 2003

Abstract

The paper studies what is the optimal financial vehicle that serves a monopoly best interest in nurturing his investees and at the same time can provide a socially optimal welfare. I demonstrate that it is the equity contract that serves the monopoly best interest because the profits it generates are higher than the profits derived from the collateral debt and convertible debt contract. In addition, I show that the equity contract is socially better than the debt-linked. I also show that neither equity nor debt-linked contracts are able to reveal the ability of the entrepreneur.

JEL Classification: G24, D82

Suggested Citation

Ayayi, Ayi Gavriel, The One Period Problem of a Monopoly Incentive Compatible Equity and Debt-linked Contracts (April 24, 2003). EFMA 2003 Helsinki Meetings. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=391577 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.391577

Ayi Gavriel Ayayi (Contact Author)

Université du Québec ( email )

3351 Boulevard des Forges C.P 500
Trois Rivières, Québec G9A 5H7
Canada
819 376-5011 ext 3137 (Phone)

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