Does government contracting influence wage theft?

49 Pages Posted: 4 Sep 2021 Last revised: 21 Aug 2023

See all articles by Justin Chircop

Justin Chircop

Lancaster University Management School

Monika Tarsalewska

University of Exeter Business School

Agnieszka Trzeciakiewicz

School for Business and Society - University of York

Date Written: December 9, 2022

Abstract

Wage theft is the largest form of theft committed in the U.S. It includes the lack of payment for overtime hours or forcing employees to underreport hours worked. We examine the relation between government contracting and wage theft and find that contracting with government agencies is related to a reduction in wage theft. Further analysis shows that this relation is driven by contractor improved financial reporting. Cross-sectional analysis suggests that this relation is more pronounced when there is greater scope for government monitoring of its contractors and contractors have fewer incentives to commit wage theft. To mitigate endogeneity concerns we perform differences-in-differences identification tests based on first time government contractors and the Obama Administration government contracting reform.

Keywords: government procurement, wage theft, employee wellbeing

JEL Classification: G18, G38, G39, J31, J83, M14, M41

Suggested Citation

Chircop, Justin and Tarsalewska, Monika and Trzeciakiewicz, Agnieszka, Does government contracting influence wage theft? (December 9, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3916088 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3916088

Justin Chircop

Lancaster University Management School ( email )

Lancaster University
Lancaster, Lancashire LA1 4YX
United Kingdom

Monika Tarsalewska (Contact Author)

University of Exeter Business School ( email )

Streatham Court, Streatham Campus,
Rennes Drive
Exeter, Devon EX4 4PU
United Kingdom

Agnieszka Trzeciakiewicz

School for Business and Society - University of York ( email )

Heslington
York, Yorkshire YO10 5DD
United Kingdom

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