Innovation Networks and Business-Stealing

22 Pages Posted: 10 Sep 2021 Last revised: 4 Nov 2021

See all articles by Philippe Aghion

Philippe Aghion

College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Matthew O. Jackson

Stanford University - Department of Economics; Santa Fe Institute

Antoine Mayerowitz

Paris School of Economics (PSE); College de France, Economics of Innovation Lab

Abhijit Tagade

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 5, 2021

Abstract

We use the universe of USPTO data on patents and inventors from 1976 to 2017 to look at the dynamics of coauthorship on patents and its relationship with competition. First, we find an inverted-U relationship between competition and the growth in coauthorship: the number of new collaborators on each patent is maximized at intermediate levels of competition. Next, we find that there is a surge of new coauthors at the time of invention, and then persistently fewer than normal new coauthors after a breakthrough invention. Third, the size of the surge in coauthorship are the largest, and subsequent decline the smallest, in industries with intermediate levels of competition. We also present a simple model in which researchers trade off gains from collaboration against threats of business stealing, which provides one explanation for our empirical findings.

Keywords: Innovation, Business Stealing, Collaboration, Knowledge Networks, Coauthorship

JEL Classification: D85, L14

Suggested Citation

Aghion, Philippe and Jackson, Matthew O. and Mayerowitz, Antoine and Tagade, Abhijit, Innovation Networks and Business-Stealing (September 5, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3917979 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3917979

Philippe Aghion

College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Matthew O. Jackson (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
1-650-723-3544 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stanford.edu/~jacksonm

Santa Fe Institute

1399 Hyde Park Road
Santa Fe, NM 87501
United States

Antoine Mayerowitz

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

HOME PAGE: http://https://mayerowitz.io

College de France, Economics of Innovation Lab ( email )

11, place Marcelin Berthelot
Paris, 75231
France

HOME PAGE: http://https://mayerowitz.io

Abhijit Tagade

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics ( email )

32 Lincoln’s Inn Fields
London WC2A 3PH
United Kingdom

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
148
Abstract Views
408
rank
252,251
PlumX Metrics