Innovation Networks and Business-Stealing

Aghion, P., Jackson, M. O., Mayerowitz, A., and Tagade, A. (2023). Innovation Networks and Business-Stealing. CEPR Discussion Paper DP17911.

30 Pages Posted: 10 Sep 2021 Last revised: 21 Feb 2023

See all articles by Philippe Aghion

Philippe Aghion

College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Matthew O. Jackson

Stanford University - Department of Economics; Santa Fe Institute

Antoine Mayerowitz

Paris School of Economics (PSE); College de France, Economics of Innovation Lab

Abhijit Tagade

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 5, 2021

Abstract

We use the universe of US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) data on patents and inventors from 1976 to 2017 to look at how inventors potential concern for business-stealing affects coauthorship on patents. First, we find an inverted-U shape in the fraction of coauthors that an inventor has per year who are new as a function number of other inventors also working in an inventor’s field. Second, we find that after a breakthrough invention, an inventor brings in persistently fewer than usual new coauthors. Third, a higher potential concern for business stealing—as measured either by the number of others working or the average price markups by firms in the area—leads to a higher drop in the fraction of new co-authors per patent after a breakthrough. We show how these patterns can be explained via a simple model in which inventors trade off gains from collaboration against threats of business stealing.

Keywords: Innovation, Business Stealing, Collaboration, Knowledge Networks, Coauthorship

JEL Classification: D85, L14

Suggested Citation

Aghion, Philippe and Jackson, Matthew O. and Mayerowitz, Antoine and Tagade, Abhijit, Innovation Networks and Business-Stealing (September 5, 2021). Aghion, P., Jackson, M. O., Mayerowitz, A., and Tagade, A. (2023). Innovation Networks and Business-Stealing. CEPR Discussion Paper DP17911., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3917979 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3917979

Philippe Aghion

College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Matthew O. Jackson (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
1-650-723-3544 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stanford.edu/~jacksonm

Santa Fe Institute

1399 Hyde Park Road
Santa Fe, NM 87501
United States

Antoine Mayerowitz

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

HOME PAGE: http://https://mayerowitz.io

College de France, Economics of Innovation Lab ( email )

11, place Marcelin Berthelot
Paris, 75231
France

HOME PAGE: http://https://mayerowitz.io

Abhijit Tagade

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics ( email )

32 Lincoln’s Inn Fields
London WC2A 3PH
United Kingdom

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