Fracking: A Contiguity-Related Redistricting Metric

Cervas, Jonathan and Bernard Grofman. 2021. "Fracking: A Contiguity-Related Redistricting Metric". August 31, 2021. https://electionlawblog.org/?p=124386

5 Pages Posted: 12 Oct 2021

See all articles by Jonathan Cervas

Jonathan Cervas

Carnegie Mellon University - Institute for Politics and Strategy

Bernard Grofman

University of California, Irvine

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 29, 2021

Abstract

The aim of this short blog is to add a useful term, fracking, to the list of geographically defined redistricting criteria. Fracking is defined as a situation in which a county or city or other well-established political subunit is found in two or more discontiguous pieces within the same legislative or congressional district. This criterion has been identified by some courts and legislatures but had never been given a name. For example, in Common Cause v. Rucho No. 1:16-CV-1026 (U.S. District Court, Middle District of North Carolina, 2018, slip op at p. 105 [p. 194]) the North Carolina legislature is quoted as asserting that one of the districting criteria that it implicitly relied upon was that “a district line should not traverse a county line more than once.” This criterion was first labeled “fracking” by Bernard Grofman in his special master report in the Bethune-Hill racial gerrymandering case. Fracking can be used as a gerrymandering tool, with fracking that involves pieces whose racial or partisan composition differs from that of the geographic area between the fracks. The name was chosen to resonate with other terms in the redistricting literature that have been applied in the gerrymandering context: namely, cracking, stacking, and packing…

Suggested Citation

Cervas, Jonathan and Grofman, Bernard, Fracking: A Contiguity-Related Redistricting Metric (August 29, 2021). Cervas, Jonathan and Bernard Grofman. 2021. "Fracking: A Contiguity-Related Redistricting Metric". August 31, 2021. https://electionlawblog.org/?p=124386, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3918044 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3918044

Jonathan Cervas (Contact Author)

Carnegie Mellon University - Institute for Politics and Strategy ( email )

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Bernard Grofman

University of California, Irvine ( email )

School of Social Sciences
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Irvine, CA 92697
United States
19497331094 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~bgrofman/

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