Reimagining the Governance of College Sports After Alston

52 Pages Posted: 16 Sep 2021 Last revised: 20 Sep 2021

See all articles by John T. Holden

John T. Holden

Oklahoma State University

Marc Edelman

City University of New York - Baruch College, Zicklin School of Business; Fordham University School of Law

Thomas Baker

University of Georgia

Andrew G. Shuman

University of Michigan Hospitals - Department of Otalaryngology

Date Written: September 14, 2021

Abstract

The Summer of 2021 marked a major inflection point in the external governance of college sports. After nearly half a century of federal and state governments taking a hands-off approach with regard to the rights of college athletes, nearly all at once several states passed laws granting college athletes the right to endorse products. Next, in its first decision concerning the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) since 1985, the United States Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s longstanding restraints on providing unlimited educational benefits to college athletes violated federal antitrust law. Additionally, Congress began discussing the lack of medical benefits afforded to college athletes, holding hearings in which current and former college athletes testified regarding necessary baseline standards for health and safety and increased mental health resources for student-athletes.

In light of these widespread external developments, questions now loom surrounding how collegiate athletics will function on an internal level. Building upon these recent state and federal developments to reform college sports and looking to the Supreme Court’s decision from last term, National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston, this Article offers a roadmap for reimagining the internal governance structure of college athletics in the 21st Century. In doing so, this Article proceeds in four main parts. First, Part I of this Article examines the history and rise of the NCAA as the premier governing body of intercollegiate sports in the United States. Next, Part II explores the evolving and widespread societal scrutiny of college athletics by looking to the five perspectives from which collegiate sports are most often criticized. Subsequently, Part III examines how recent Congressional developments, state law initiatives, and the Alston decision, require reimagining the internal governance structure currently in place in college athletics. Lastly, building upon the history of the NCAA model and its criticisms, and considering the recent regulatory and judicial developments that materialized in 2021, Part IV proposes a template for building a new governance model that, moving forward, will better protect and promote the rights of college athletes from an ethical, legal, and medical standpoint.

Keywords: Alston, NCAA, Governance, College sports, Sports law

JEL Classification: Z2, Z21, Z28, K21, K31, I00, I1, I10, I2, I20, I23, I28, I38, J47, J5, J88

Suggested Citation

Holden, John and Edelman, Marc and Baker, Thomas and Shuman, Andrew G., Reimagining the Governance of College Sports After Alston (September 14, 2021). Florida Law Review, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3923692

John Holden (Contact Author)

Oklahoma State University ( email )

201 Business Building
Stillwater, OK 74078-0555
United States

Marc Edelman

City University of New York - Baruch College, Zicklin School of Business ( email )

One Bernard Baruch Way
Box B9-220
New York, NY 10010
United States

Fordham University School of Law ( email )

140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States

Thomas Baker

University of Georgia ( email )

4458 Tacoma Trce.
Suwanee, GA GA 30024
United States
3525148113 (Phone)
3525148113 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://coe.uga.edu/directory/profiles/tab3

Andrew G. Shuman

University of Michigan Hospitals - Department of Otalaryngology ( email )

1500 E. Medical Center Drive
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States

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