Effect of Juvenile Justice Fee Repeal on Financial Sanctions Borne by Families

55 Pages Posted: 16 Sep 2021 Last revised: 17 Mar 2022

See all articles by Jaclyn Chambers

Jaclyn Chambers

University of California, Berkeley

Karin D. Martin

University of Washington

Jennifer L. Skeem

University of California, Berkeley

Date Written: September 14, 2021

Abstract

Juvenile justice agencies often impose fees on parents and guardians to offset the cost of their child’s legal representation, detention, and supervision. Increasingly, advocates are calling for fee repeal, to mitigate the costs and harms of various monetary sanctions. However, there has not been an empirical examination of 1) the financial impact of fee repeal on families and 2) whether fee repeal may cause a compensatory increase in other financial sanctions, such as fines. This study examines whether repealing fees has an appreciable effect on the financial burden families carry. Applying targeted maximum likelihood estimation – a rigorous causal inference approach – to data on 2,401 youth placed on probation before and after a fee repeal in Alameda County, we estimate that the likelihood of experiencing any financial sanction was 22.2% lower post-repeal compared to pre-repeal, and the total amount of sanctions was $1,583 (or 70%) lower. Additionally, there was no evidence that repealing fees increased other types of financial sanctions. Our analysis indicates that fee repeal can be a powerful policy lever for doing less financial harm to families during their children’s terms of probation. This study provides empirical evidence that helps inform a growing national effort to eliminate juvenile fees.

Keywords: juvenile justice, financial sanctions, fees and fines, reform

Suggested Citation

Chambers, Jaclyn and Martin, Karin D. and Skeem, Jennifer L., Effect of Juvenile Justice Fee Repeal on Financial Sanctions Borne by Families (September 14, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3923878 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3923878

Jaclyn Chambers (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Karin D. Martin

University of Washington ( email )

Seattle
United States

Jennifer L. Skeem

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

120 Haviland Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7400
United States

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