Co-opetition and the Firm’s Information Environment

68 Pages Posted: 20 Sep 2021

See all articles by Brian J. Bushee

Brian J. Bushee

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Thomas Keusch

INSEAD

Jessica Kim-Gina

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Accounting Area

Date Written: September 17, 2021

Abstract

Some firms in the technology sector choose to cooperate with competitors (“co-opetition”) in Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs). These SSOs create technology standards that facilitate rapid market penetration of new technologies such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and 4G. Active participation in the standard setting process requires the exchange of proprietary information with competitors. While the goal of such information sharing is to further a technology or a market, firms potentially receive an unintended benefit from access to competitor and industry information. We examine whether active SSO participation enhances a firm’s information set and allows managers to better predict future sales. Conducting within-firm analyses, we find that the centrality of a firm’s location within the network of SSO collaborators is positively related to the accuracy of the firm’s sales forecasts. This relation is stronger when firms share more information with direct competitors, when forecasting is more difficult ex ante, and when firms forecast over longer horizons. Our findings show that collaborating with competitors in the product market provides an important unintended benefit of improving the manager’s information set.

Keywords: Technology, Co-opetition, Information Environment, Management Forecasts

JEL Classification: L14, L15, M41, O32

Suggested Citation

Bushee, Brian J. and Keusch, Thomas and Kim-Gina, Jessica, Co-opetition and the Firm’s Information Environment (September 17, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3925687 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3925687

Brian J. Bushee

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
215-898-4872 (Phone)
215-573-2054 (Fax)

Thomas Keusch

INSEAD ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

Jessica Kim-Gina (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Accounting Area ( email )

D410 Anderson Complex
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/kim-gina

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