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Search Without Looking

38 Pages Posted: 21 Sep 2021 Last revised: 2 Aug 2022 Publication Status: Published

See all articles by Alexander Matros

Alexander Matros

Moore School of Business

Natalia Ponomareva

Macquarie University - Division of Economic and Financial Studies; Macquarie University, Macquarie Business School

Vladimir Smirnov

The University of Sydney - School of Economics

Andrew Wait

University of Sydney

Abstract

We analyze a dynamic game in which agents strategically search for a prize/reward of known value when they cannot observe the search of others. In every period the rivals decide how much to search. The prize goes to the player who finds it first unless there is simultaneous discovery, in which case the reward is destroyed. In the unique symmetric open loop Nash equilibrium all players receive an expected payoff of zero. A third party could however increase welfare and avoid some search duplication by allocating search zones, even if these exclusive search zones are non-binding.

Keywords: search, unobservability, duplication, regulatory design

Suggested Citation

Matros, Alexander and Ponomareva, Natalia and Smirnov, Vladimir and Wait, Andrew, Search Without Looking. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3927612

Alexander Matros (Contact Author)

Moore School of Business ( email )

1014 Greene St
Columbia, SC 29208
United States

Natalia Ponomareva

Macquarie University - Division of Economic and Financial Studies ( email )

United States

Macquarie University, Macquarie Business School ( email )

New South Wales 2109
Australia

Vladimir Smirnov

The University of Sydney - School of Economics ( email )

Rm 370 Merewether (H04)
The University of Sydney
Sydney, NSW 2006 2008
Australia

Andrew Wait

University of Sydney ( email )

School of Economics
University of Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia
+61-2-9351-3060 (Phone)
+61-2-9351-4341 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://sydney.edu.au/arts/economics/

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