Intra-Jurisdictional Tax Competition

16 Pages Posted: 4 Apr 2003

See all articles by Jonathan Klick

Jonathan Klick

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School; Erasmus School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna


While much has been written about inter-jurisdictional competition for tax revenues, especially concerning the choice between harmonization and competition, the literature has largely ignored intra-jurisdiction issues. The few articles examining this issue focus on how lower level governmental entities react to the tax decisions of a national government. However, in some instances, multiple co-equal taxing authorities might share the same base. These bodies face a dilemma over whether to harmonize their policies or to compete. We present a simple model of revenue maximizing tax authorities and derive the conditions under which harmonization dominates competition.

Keywords: Tax, Federalism, Harmonization, Rent-Seeking, Commons

JEL Classification: H20, H77

Suggested Citation

Klick, Jonathan and Parisi, Francesco, Intra-Jurisdictional Tax Competition. Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 387-395, December 2005, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-16, Available at SSRN: or

Jonathan Klick (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School ( email )

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Erasmus School of Law ( email )

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PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

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Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )

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Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

University of Bologna ( email )

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40126 Bologna, fc 47100

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