16 Pages Posted: 4 Apr 2003
While much has been written about inter-jurisdictional competition for tax revenues, especially concerning the choice between harmonization and competition, the literature has largely ignored intra-jurisdiction issues. The few articles examining this issue focus on how lower level governmental entities react to the tax decisions of a national government. However, in some instances, multiple co-equal taxing authorities might share the same base. These bodies face a dilemma over whether to harmonize their policies or to compete. We present a simple model of revenue maximizing tax authorities and derive the conditions under which harmonization dominates competition.
Keywords: Tax, Federalism, Harmonization, Rent-Seeking, Commons
JEL Classification: H20, H77
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Klick, Jonathan and Parisi, Francesco, Intra-Jurisdictional Tax Competition. Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 387-395, December 2005; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-16. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=392820 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.392820